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Abstract
This thematic issue brings together ten articles from political psychology, political sociology, philosophy, history, public
policy, media studies, and electoral studies, which examine reactionary politics and resentful affect in populist times.
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This thematic issue examines reactionary politics and
resentful affect in populist times. It brings together
ten articles on research agendas from political psy‐
chology, political sociology, philosophy, history, public
policy, media studies, and electoral studies, which dis‐
cuss extensively a particular set of interrelated puzzles
of grievance politics: the distrust and disillusionment
expressed towards institutions of democracy, the reluc‐
tance or diminished capacity to engage with facts,
the increase in the prevalence of anti‐immigration,
anti‐science and anti‐elite sentiments, the rise in spite‐
ful and intolerant antagonisms. These orientations and
affects towards governments and politics coincide with
the rise of populist parties around the globe, and the
strengthened traction of nationalist, authoritarian, and
extremist discourses in mainstream and fringe political
actors and movements. There can be no doubt that
these conditions generate significant agitations with pro‐
found political, social, psychological, and cultural conse‐
quences, which urgently need solutions.
We focus on “reactionism” as a lasting and insis‐
tent cluster orientation that consolidates cognitive, affec‐
tive and motivational drivers of populist support. It has
become apparent to us through our own research that
at the core of conflicts and challenges for democratic
politics lie contrasting and incompatible ways of making
sense of theworld,which in turn rest on a divide involving
attitudes towards change (Wolfe, 1923). Reactionism, like
radicalism seeks to urgently uproot the status quo. It is
distinguished from conservatismwhich seeks to preserve
the status quo, or progressivism and retrogressivism
which harbour the desire for gradual and orderly reform
(Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018). Uncompromising reaction‐
ism and revolutionary radicalism share disaffection with
the present but their realities collide as they gaze in oppo‐
site directions: the reactionary orientation towards the
restoration of an often idealised past, and the radical ori‐
entation towards the establishment of a different, imag‐
ined future. These orientations, often in interaction with
each other, are candidates for anomic and violent politi‐
cal engagement founded on grievances, disaffection and
anti‐social stances towards others in society.
We focus on “resentful affect” in order to under‐
stand the frustrated, vengeful and bitter emotions of
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populist politics, which in our view extend beyond binary
analyses of political emotionality of angry vs. afraid cit‐
izens (Capelos et al., 2017). Our research on the polit‐
ical affectivity of reactionary grievance politics finds it
to be frustrated and aggressive, anxious and spiteful,
sour and bitter, perpetuating vindictiveness and self‐
victimization (Bee & Chrona, 2017; Capelos & Chrona,
2018; Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). These seemingly
contradictory affective experiences we identify here as
“resentful affect” contain resentment expressed asmoral
anger at unfairness or injustice, as well as the under‐
explored psychological experience of ressentiment (writ‐
ten in italics throughout this thematic issue and the field
more broadly, to denote the technical term introduced
by Nietzsche [1885/1961] and elaborated by Scheler
[1915/1961]). Ressentiment is marked by the uncon‐
scious transformation of envy, shame, or inefficacious
anger of powerless and frustrated individuals into vin‐
dictiveness and hatred, compensating for a chronic per‐
ceived inferiority and deficiency to attain what one val‐
ues or desires. The “individual of ressentiment” alters the
value of what is desired to undesirable, and the value of
the self from inferior to amorally superior victim. Its con‐
viction of moral victimhood is preserved through social‐
sharing practices with like‐minded peers with long‐term
anti‐social implications. Ressentiment can bemanifested
in animus politics as its outcome emotions of hatred,
vindictiveness and resentment, and also scapegoating,
vengeance, and intolerance (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018;
Salmela, 2019; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017, 2018).
The original articles hosted here investigate further
the conceptual and empirical puzzles arising from reac‐
tionary and resentful politics. They offer in‐depth under‐
standing of the individual and collective dynamics of
resentful reaction, focusing on the convictions, sympa‐
thies, loyalties, and beliefs that feed it, the ressentiment‐
ful emotional mechanism that delivers it, the values that
motivate it, and the emotions it stirs up. They investigate
the role of personality and group attachments in explain‐
ing reactionary anti‐stances. They shed light on recipro‐
cal processes of reactionary radicalization and resentful
affectivity. They trace social media campaigns in fram‐
ing issues that resonate with citizens’ worries and frus‐
trations; they analyse the function of symbols in giv‐
ing meaning, purpose, and passion to group identities.
They highlight the importance of economic hardship and
cultural and political contexts in generating or appeas‐
ing grievances. And together they interrogate the social,
political, and psychological function of resentful reaction
for democratic politics, tackling theoretical and empirical
questions that are as challenging as they are important.
The thematic issue begins with the article by Mikko
Salmela and Tereza Capelos (2021) titled “Ressentiment:
A Complex Emotion or an Emotional Mechanism of
Psychic Defenses?” An analytical philosopher (Salmela)
and a political psychologist (Capelos) recognize ressenti‐
ment as the affective driver of reactionism, Islamic fun‐
damentalism, and radicalism and join forces to tackle
the puzzle many scholars have grappled with: what is
ressentiment. They examine theoretical accounts from
philosophy, sociology, psychoanalysis, and political psy‐
chology, and break new ground theorising ressenti‐
ment as an emotional mechanism triggered by envy,
shame, or inefficacious anger, which produces resent‐
ment, indignation, and hatred through a four‐stage pro‐
cess that involves idiosyncratic defences determined
by individuals’ ego strength. Their theoretical model
specifically explores individual and social level processes.
Intraindividually, the emotional mechanism of ressen‐
timent reinforces a morally superior sense of victim‐
hood and expedites two parallel transvaluation pro‐
cesses which change what was once desired to undesir‐
able and rotten, and one’s inferior self to being a morally
superior victim. Social sharing with like‐minded peers
consolidates the other‐directed negative emotions, val‐
ues, and identities in ressentiment through shallow twin‐
ship bonds giving rise to destructive and vengeful collec‐
tive behaviours.
In “Islamist and Nativist Reactionary Radicalization in
Europe,” Ayhan Kaya (2021) makes a strong contribution
to understanding co‐radicalization by emphasising the
defensive and reactionary response of Islamist youth and
right‐wing nativist‐populist Europe youth, suffering from
social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, sub‐
ordination, alienation, humiliation, and isolation. Kaya
adopts an interdisciplinary perspective joining insights
from politics, anthropology, psychology, and geography
to extend our understanding of co‐radicalization through
interviews of young people in Belgium, France, Germany,
and the Netherlands. He finds the drivers of radical‐
ization between the two groups to be similar, high‐
lighting deprivations that span across political, socio‐
economic, and psychological conditions. In this project
funded by the European Research Council (ERC), Kaya
explains that reactionary Islamist and right‐wing populist‐
nativist groups are best understood as defensive move‐
ments of individuals pressurised by modernization and
globalization. Their co‐radicalization is in essence a prod‐
uct of the identity politics of neoliberalism giving rise to
Islamophobia, nativism, and religio‐political and ethno‐
cultural polarizations.
In “Reimagining the Medieval: The Utility of
Ethnonational Symbols for Reactionary Transnational
Social Movements” Matthew Godwin and Elisabeth
Trischler (2021) bring the perspective of historical analy‐
sis to the examination of ethnonational symbols as strate‐
gic framing devices used by reactionary movements in
Europe. Focusing on the Identitarians and the Defence
Leagues, Godwin and Trischler analyse images and nar‐
ratives that feature knights and the crusades and show
how “radical nostalgia” of the medieval period sits at the
core of their reimagination of a lost “golden age” of a
Christian Europe. Their research highlights the value of
ethnonational symbols derived from themedieval period
for identity construction and identity promotion. This
reactionary “political medievalism” is urgent, nativist,
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and xenophobic. It is constructed on a “us against them”
struggle, mobilizes against “threats” by assigning blame,
and legitimizes the use of violence against multicultur‐
alism and Islam. The moralization of the objective of
these reactionary movements invites research on their
ressentimentful affective character.
In “Double Ressentiment: The Political Communica‐
tion of Kulturkampf in Hungary,” Balázs Kiss (2021)
employs qualitative content analysis to examine ressen‐
timent as an affective style that dominates the social
media discourses of the culture war between opposing
political camps in Hungary. The affective style of ressen‐
timent refers to the inclination to interpret events as a
recurrent unjust and inevitable injury from the position
of the helpless victim. As the identity of the victim is rede‐
fined to a moral martyr through the emotional mech‐
anism of ressentiment, comparison with others who
seem “better‐off” feeds envy and incubates aversions.
Without doubt, the value of this article extends beyond
understanding Orbanism and Hungarian politics: It offers
political communication insights on the way emotions,
and in particular ressentimentful impotent vengeance,
hatred, fear, and powerlessness, can be employed by
opposing actors tomanage citizens’ responses to politics.
Transvaluation, scapegoating, blame externalization, and
vindictive moral superiority define the two‐way interac‐
tions between opposing political communities that Kiss
aptly calls “double‐ressentiment.”
Karen Celis, Louise Knops, Virginie Van Ingelgom, and
Soetkin Verhaegen (2021) examine the implications of
expressing resentment for the “crisis of representative
democracy,” in their article titled “Resentment and cop‐
ing with the democratic dilemma.” Using data from four
focus groups conducted in Belgium with members of
the Yellow Vests and Youth for Climate movements, as
well as individuals from socially disadvantaged positions,
the authors identify strong feelings of anger, fear, disap‐
pointment, and unfairness, but also feelings of empow‐
erment, enthusiasm, and hope in discussions involving
representative democracy. The objects of this resentful
affectivity varied as citizens directed their anger, disap‐
pointment, perceptions of unfairness, and hope in differ‐
ent ways when they discussed elections, politicians, pol‐
icy implementation, and the democratic system overall.
Celis and her colleagues listen very competently to the
“heart” of representative democracy and identify its com‐
plex affective profile. The “democratic dilemma” high‐
lighted by the authors involves recognizing frustrations
and grievances while maintaining hope and sustaining
democratic values and ideals. The authors do not rush to
easy answers, recognizing the complexity of their puzzle.
They suggest future studies could explore further shifts
“within resentful affectivity,” to gain understanding on
the distinctions between resentment and ressentiment
as some citizens remain within, and others go beyond
democratic boundaries in their political engagement.
Sabrina Jasmin Mayer and Christoph Giang Nguyen
(2021) examine the mechanism that connects reac‐
tionary political orientations, personality predisposition
to narcissistic rivalry, anger, and support for radical
right populist parties (RRP) in their contribution titled
“Angry Reactionary Narcissists? Anger Activates the Link
Between Narcissism and Right‐Populist Party Support.”
They hypothesise that narcissistic rivalry, a maladap‐
tive path of grandiose narcissism, motivates voting for
the RRP party Alternative für Deutschland and that this
effect is mediated by reactionary political orientations
and activated by anger. They test this hypothesis through
mediation analysis of GESIS panel data from Germany.
The authors find that indicators of reactionary political
orientations predict RRP support. Moreover, high levels
of generalized anger are needed to activate the rela‐
tionship between narcissistic rivalry, reactionary values,
and RRP support. These findings raise interesting ques‐
tions about the role of anger and might explain why
only some people show support for RRP. As the authors
note, the relationship between narcissistic rivalry, reac‐
tionary orientations, and political preferences begs for
further investigation.
Gavin Brent Sullivan (2021) introduces the frame‐
work of affective practice in his analysis of political reac‐
tionism in England. In his article “Political Reactionism
as Affective Practice: UKIP Supporters and Non‐Voters
in Pre‐Brexit England” the author examines how the
ressentimentful affective features of reactionary politi‐
cal stances are created, shared or suppressed, facilitated,
mobilised, and transformed in everyday actions. Using
reflexive thematic analysis of interview data with UKIP
voters and non‐voters, Sullivan finds evidence of ressenti‐
ment (shame, transvaluation, victimhood, a sense of loss,
powerlessness) and reactionism (desire for change back‐
wards, nostalgia, opposition to the status quo). He also
notes that expressions of anger were used to conceal
shame or proneness to humiliation during discussions
of anti‐political stances. Sullivan’s study urges us to pay
attention to emotions used in conversation that cover
painful feelings, and invites us to engage more with rich
data collection methodologies that examine emotional
activity and practices on the left and the right of the ide‐
ological spectrum.
Diogo Ferrari (2021) tackles the question of why pop‐
ulist parties find support for their ideas among the elec‐
torate, in his article “Perceptions, Resentment, Economic
Distress, and Support for Right‐Wing Populist Parties
in Europe.” Ferrari focuses on micro‐level effects of
household‐level economic conditions, and notes that
low andmiddle‐income populations aremore vulnerable
to economic distress. This in turn increases their resent‐
ment (measured here as dissatisfaction with democ‐
racy), and their threat assessment of immigration, which
then increases the likelihood of voting for populist par‐
ties. Using European Social Survey (ESS) data across
18 countries, Ferrari shows that voting for right‐wing
populist parties is predicted by changes in household
income, while accounting for the mediation effect of
an index measuring economic and cultural threat and
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 186–190 188
satisfaction with democracy. This article draws attention
to the micro‐level hardships that can attract voters to
solutions offered by right wing populists, adding to lit‐
erature that favours macro level economic or cultural
explanations. Improving families’ finances and alleviat‐
ing economic hardships, shows Ferrari, could be an effec‐
tive measure to curb the rise of populism.
In “Feeling Left Behind by Political Decisionmakers:
Anti‐Establishment Sentiment in Contemporary Demo‐
cracies,” Luigi Droste (2021) deals with the pressing puz‐
zle of what drives populist and reactionary discontent in
democratic societies. Using survey data from 20 contem‐
porary democracies from two International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) waves, Droste uses a multilevel hybrid
model that allows for individual and country level effects
and longitudinal components. Droste finds differences
between counties and individuals: Anti‐establishment
attitudes are more widespread among publics in coun‐
tries exposed to higher levels of public corruption and
increasing levels of income inequality, and also among
citizens that are younger and in lower ranks of soci‐
ety. Moreover, citizens who experience discontent show
increased support for anti‐elite parties and make use
of online options to express their opinions. Recognizing
the lack of affect measures in cross‐country comparative
datasets, Droste concludes with an important question:
Is the political action of those “feeling left behind” resent‐
ful or ressentimentful in its core?
Maximilian Conrad (2021) focuses on “Post‐Truth
Politics, Digital Media and the Politicization of the Global
Compact for Migration.” Acknowledging the important
role of social media as vehicles of disinformation, Conrad
investigates the debate over the Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in Germany,
Austria, and Sweden. Using process‐tracing, the author
analyses the frames used by right‐wing populist actors,
how they were received by the public, and describes
the ways in which they generated communicative power
against the GCM,making it a salient issue across national
public spheres and political institutions. The study show‐
cases the crucial role of digital and social media for the
politicization of issues capitalised upon by right‐wing
populist actors for political gain. It closes with the invi‐
tation to engage seriously with the complexities and
impacts of digital engagement that generate resent‐
ment and fear and challenge deliberative democracy in
post‐truth politics.
If animus and caritas are the two sides of our human
condition, reconciling them can be our perennial strug‐
gle for democratic politics. The above articles forward
new theory, survey the field, complement each other by
employing qualitative and quantitative methodologies,
and collectively deliver research that seeks to make con‐
structive contributions to this pressing puzzle: If the reac‐
tionary orientation obstructs innovation in favour of ren‐
ovation and harbours bitter and vengeful affects, can its
needs be reconciled within the framework of democratic
politics that seeks growth and development, and what
are the avenues for positive, constructive engagement
with reactionary minds and hearts?We feel privileged to
work with our colleagues on investigating this puzzle and
to deliver this thematic issue. We recognize there is still
a long way to go and hope this thematic issue offers valu‐
able knowledge, new insights, and opportunities for fur‐
ther interdisciplinary research and collaborative work.
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